(originally published in Japanese on 1 August 2024)
Discussion on the revision of Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan has begun. There are a number of key issues up for discussion, including power generation mix targets for renewable energy, how to address decarbonized fuels, and the outlook for the decarbonization of Japan’s industries as well as the growth in demand for electric power, many of which have already begun to be explored in this column series. In this column, I would like to examine one of the most important issues for the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which oversees Japan’s energy policy. It appears that the agency is aiming to cement the revival of nuclear power by ensuring that construction of new nuclear power plants, as proposed in the country’s Green Transformation (GX) plans, is reflected in the Strategic Energy Plan. However, can such a plan be considered realistic?
Positioning of nuclear power in Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident
Negative public sentiment toward nuclear power soared in the aftermath of the 2011 TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident (the Fukushima nuclear accident), and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration in power at the time passed a cabinet decision in the form of the Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment, which aimed to phase out nuclear power. Although the Liberal Democratic Party took over the power from DPJ and the administration of Shinzo Abe, who came to power for a second term as Prime Minister in 2012, immediately rejected this strategy, the 4th Strategic Energy Plan in 2014 stated that “dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the extent possible” (Table)1. In the process of formulating this plan, METI, which sought to revive nuclear power, lobbied the prime minister’s office to include the construction of new nuclear power plants in the document. However, this was reportedly deferred due to concerns about public backlash (Asahi Shimbun, 14 January 2014).
Table: Statements by the Japanese Government Regarding Nuclear Power
This policy of reducing dependence on nuclear power was “the starting point for rebuilding Japan’s energy policy” (4th Strategic Energy Plan), and this direction was maintained in subsequent plans. Although the 5th Strategic Energy Plan released in 2018 did not differ substantially from the 4th Strategic Energy Plan to begin with, it maintained the policy of lowering dependency on nuclear power to the extent possible, and METI’s efforts to lobby the prime minister’s office for construction of new nuclear power plants were once again “turned away” (Asahi Shimbun, 1 August 2018). While the lack of progress in restarting Japan’s nuclear power plants poses a problem for METI, the scenario that they most wish to avoid is that unless new nuclear power plants are built, nuclear energy will eventually be phased out. The 6th Strategic Energy Plan released in 2021 was impacted by Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s declaration that Japan would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, which made it necessary to increase decarbonized power sources. The plan clearly stated Japan’s commitment to introducing renewable energy as “top priority,” and the target power generation mix for renewable energy in 2030 was raised from 22–24% in the 5th Strategic Energy Plan to 36–38%. In contrast, despite strong demands from the business sector, the plan did not specify the construction of new nuclear power plants (Mainichi Shimbun, 20 August 2021), and “lowering dependency on nuclear power generation to the extent possible” and the 20–22% target for power generation mix were both maintained.
Revival of Nuclear Power through GX Plans
As described above, even the stable Abe and Suga administrations maintained the same cautious stance on nuclear power. This suddenly changed from 2022 to 2023 with the GX (Green Transformation) policy adopted by the administration of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
According to Yasutoshi Nishimura, Minister for Green Transformation and Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, the government’s GX plans are a mobilized policy response to the energy crisis in 2022 triggered by the invasion of Ukraine, as well as to the Japan’s pressing electricity supply and demand problem, due in part to the delay in restarting nuclear power plants (Minutes of the Second Meeting of the GX Implementation Council, August 24, 2022). Although there are many issues to be discussed with regard to GX, the biggest achievement for METI is likely the fact that it specified the construction of new nuclear power plants in the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX released in February 2023 (“building next-generation innovative reactors”) and successfully established related laws thereafter. METI claims that the reinstatement of nuclear power is essential in order to respond to these global and domestic crises, while simultaneously achieving decarbonization.
Regarding the awareness of these background developments, I previously explained in this column (13 September 2022) that unlike Europe, the impact of the 2022 energy crisis on Japan was limited to fossil fuel prices, and that the primary causes of the electricity supply-demand imbalance were sudden, isolated incidents such as the 2022 Earthquake off the Coast of Fukushima Prefecture in March and the first “extremely hot day” ever recorded in June, both of which were limited to TEPCO service areas, and that there is no absolute shortage in Japan’s supply capacity. If METI is concerned about an energy security crisis, its top priority should be to accelerate the introduction of purely domestic, decarbonized renewable energy. However, the government’s GX policy did not include any substantial measures to strengthen renewable energy.
Nevertheless, the claim that nuclear power was essential to address the energy crisis was successful in persuading the public to a certain extent2. While keeping a firm eye on the shift in previously negative public sentiment toward nuclear power, METI was essentially able to specify that new nuclear power plants would be built after just several months of discussions at the GX Implementation Council and the Nuclear Energy Subcommittee. The Basic Policy for the Realization of GX contains no mention of the “reduction of dependency on nuclear power as much as possible3”stated in previous Strategic Energy Plans, and instead states that nuclear power “will be used to maximum potential” (see Table). During this time, there was no increase in public debate, including in the Diet, on the pros and cons of nuclear power. For METI, which had long sought an opportunity to reinstate nuclear power following the Fukushima nuclear accident, 2022 was the perfect storm4.
Consistency between Japan’s GX and Strategic Energy Plans
As described above, it appears that nuclear power has been revived. However, one final step remains—the upcoming revision of Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan. The Strategic Energy Plan is the “basic policy” and prescribes matters that form the “basis of measures” for Japan’s energy policy as described in the Basic Act on Energy Policy (Article 1 of the Act). Although the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX was established and its related laws have even been passed, nevertheless, reflecting this policy in the Strategic Energy Plan will cement the revival of nuclear energy.
This would involve removing the wording “lowering dependency on nuclear power generation to the extent possible” from the Strategic Energy Plan and specifying that new nuclear power plants will be built. In fact, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan advocated these two points at a press conference held by its chairman on 17 May 20245. From a logical perspective, there is no need to build new nuclear power plants if the objective is to lower dependency on nuclear power generation to the extent possible. The Basic Policy for the Realization of GX, which was announced by METI through the Prime Minister’s Office in 2023, went beyond the 6th Strategic Energy Plan established in 2021.
The author previously questioned METI officials at a public meeting in June 2024 regarding this issue of discrepancy between the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX and Strategic Energy Plan. When I asked if one of the points for discussion was whether the new nuclear power plant expansion outlined in the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX should be reflected in the Strategic Energy Plan, the answer, surprisingly, was that there was no discrepancy between the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX and the Strategic Energy Plan.
The Basic Policy for the Realization of GX, in fact, purposely includes an annotation stating that the construction of new nuclear power plants is “within the guidelines set by this Sixth Strategic Energy Plan.” According to this annotation, the Strategic Energy Plan stipulates that “Japan will pursue all options to realize net-zero GHG emissions by 2050” and that in regard to nuclear power plants “a necessary amount of nuclear power will be continuously utilized” (see Table), and therefore there is no contradiction between the Strategic Energy Plan and the construction of new nuclear power plants. Although as a documentation-oriented government office, they may have felt that it would not be appropriate to have any discrepancies between the existing, more authoritative government policy and the new policy that is currently being formulated, nevertheless this interpretation is still a stretch. In fact, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga stated in the Diet, “We are not considering building new nuclear power plants at present” (House of Representatives Budget Committee, 4 November 2020). The fact that a shift in policy has taken place from this time is undeniable.
When you think about it, it is an oxymoron for the government to advocate “lowering (dependency on nuclear power) to the extent possible” while also pledging to “stand at the front” to “proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants” and stating that a “necessary amount of nuclear power will be continuously utilized” (6th Strategic Energy Plan). One might imagine a counterargument being put forth that because the government states its intention to “lowering dependency on nuclear power to the extent possible, while expanding renewable energy” (5th Strategic Energy Plan; 6th Strategic Energy Plan; the underline added by the author), as long as there are limits to renewable energy relying on nuclear power to supply Japan’s remaining energy needs falls within “the extent possible,” but this sort of logic only makes sense in the world of “Kasumigaseki rhetoric.” The same applies to the counterargument that there will be no effective increase because new construction will take place “within the sites of existing nuclear power plants that have determined to be decommissioned” (Basic Policy for the Realization of GX). Rebuilding is the same as new construction and represents the active restoration of nuclear power. The government should hold its head high and declare that it has changed its policy.
Outlook for the 7th Strategic Energy Plan
In essence, METI never had plans to reduce nuclear power to the extent possible and is now engaging in a systematic and phased revival of nuclear power, successfully utilizing the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX to accomplish this goal. Accordingly, in the 7th Strategic Energy Plan, which should be the final stage of revival of nuclear power, it will aim to fully reflect the policies laid out in Basic Policy for the Realization of GX, including the two points concerning nuclear power plants. There have already been many opinions put forth at the Strategic Energy Committee, which deliberates on Strategic Energy Plan, strongly advocating for nuclear power, and the increasing demand for electricity is a premise for this discussion (column published on 12 July 2024).
The basic prerequisite for sound policy formation is to conduct a rational discussion based on accurate data and objective arguments. Those who assert that nuclear power is truly indispensable must first present the economic rationale for nuclear power in an objective manner. To claim that renewable energy is expensive and that nuclear power plants are required in order to curb electricity prices, but then stating that they can only be built using the fully distributed cost method, is a contradiction in terms6. The review of power generation costs is underway, and another point of interest is how the capital cost per unit (1.2 GW), which was set at 480 billion yen during the previous review in 2021, will be determined. Recently-built reactors in Europe and the U.S. have cost three to four times this amount.
Second, the assertion that a stable electricity supply cannot be maintained without nuclear power as a base-load power source combined with coal-fired thermal power that serves an “adjustment” role is an outdated notion that should be corrected. Even if the renewable energy mix increases to around 50%, Europe has proven that it is fully possible to maintain a stable supply by increasing flexibility based on market mechanisms. Conversely, the contradictions that exist in regions such as Kyushu, where flexibility is reduced due to the continued preferential operation of nuclear power plants, and renewable energy is increasingly curtailed irrationally, should be resolved. On several occasions, Japan has experienced a supply crisis due to a sudden drop in power supply following an earthquake or other event due to the concentrated location of large-scale power plants such as nuclear power.
Third, a shift in policy toward nuclear power is extremely significant for Japan, which experienced the Fukushima nuclear accident. When determining its innovative energy and environmental strategy, the DPJ administration conducted a “national debate” in 2012. With regard to Japan’s GX plans, the rapid and forceful manner in which decisions were made has drawn criticism. The late Hiroaki Nakanishi, chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) and a proponent of nuclear power, called for a “serious public debate” because “we cannot build something that the public is against” (Tokyo Shimbun, 5 January 2019). Although the Strategic Energy Plan also mentions “enhancement of communication with all levels of society,” there has been nothing resembling a public discussion since 2012. The primary weakness of nuclear power plants, in this author’s opinion, is the lack of trust from the public, and unless this issue is tackled head-on, nuclear power has a bleak future.
It is imperative that this extremely important revision of the Strategic Energy Plan is conducted in a manner that will result in sound policy formation and is able to win public support.
[Special Contents] Key Issues to Address in Japan's Strategic Energy Plan